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Quantum machine learning models have the potential to offer speedups and better predictive accuracy com-
pared to their classical counterparts. However, these quantum algorithms, like their classical counterparts, have
been shown to also be vulnerable to input perturbations, in particular for classification problems. These can
arise either from noisy implementations or, as a worst-case type of noise, adversarial attacks. These attacks can
undermine both the reliability and security of quantum classification algorithms. In order to develop defence
mechanisms and to better understand the reliability of these algorithms, it is crucial to understand their robust-
ness properties in presence of both natural noise sources and adversarial manipulation. From the observation
that, unlike in the classical setting, measurements involved in quantum classification algorithms are naturally
probabilistic, we uncover and formalize a fundamental link between binary quantum hypothesis testing (QHT)
and provably robust quantum classification. Then from the optimality of QHT, we prove a robustness condition,
which is tight under modest assumptions, and enables us to develop a protocol to certify robustness. Since this
robustness condition is a guarantee against the worst-case noise scenarios, our result naturally extends to scenar-
ios in which the noise source is known. Thus we also provide a framework to study the reliability of quantum
classification protocols under more general settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
The flourishing interplay between quantum computation
and machine learning has inspired a wealth of algorithmic
invention in recent years [1–3]. Among the most promising
proposals are quantum classification algorithms which aspire
to leverage the exponentially large Hilbert space uniquely ac-
cessible to quantum algorithms to either drastically speed up
computational bottlenecks in classical protocols [4–7], or to
construct quantum-enhanced kernels that are practically pro-
hibitive to compute classically [8–10]. Although these quan-
tum classifiers are recognised as having the potential to of-
fer quantum speedup or superior predictive accuracy, they are
shown to be just as vulnerable to input perturbations as their
classical counter-parts [11–14]. These perturbations can oc-
cur either due to imperfect implementation which is prevalent
in the noisy, intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) era [15], or
more menacingly due to adversarial attacks where a malicious
party aims to fool a classifier by carefully crafting practically
undetectable noise patterns which trick a model into misclas-
sifying a given input.
In order to address these short-comings in reliability and se-
curity of quantum machine learning, several protocols in the
setting of adversarial quantum learning, i.e. learning under the
worst-case noise scenario, have been developed [11, 12, 16–
18]. More recently, data encoding schemes are linked to ro-
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bustness properties of classifiers with respect to different noise
models in Ref. [19]. The connection between provable ro-
bustness and quantum differential privacy is investigated in
Ref. [17], where naturally occurring noise in quantum systems
is leveraged to increase robustness against adversaries. A fur-
ther step towards robustness guarantees is made in Ref. [18]
where an explicit bound is derived from elementary properties
of the trace distance. These advances, though having accu-
mulated considerable momentum toward a coherent strategy
for protecting quantum machine learning algorithms against
adversarial input perturbations, have not yet provided an ade-
quate framework for deriving a tight robustness condition for
any given quantum classifier. In other words, the known ro-
bustness conditions are sufficient but not, in general, neces-
sary.
Thus a major open problem remains which is significant on
both the conceptual and practical levels. Conceptually, adver-
sarial robustness, being an intrinsic property of the classifica-
tion algorithms under consideration, is only accurately quan-
tified by a tight bound, the absence of which renders the direct
robustness comparison between different quantum classifiers
implausible. Practically, an optimal robustness certification
protocol, in the sense of being capable of faithfully report-
ing the noise tolerance and resilience of a quantum algorithm
can only arise from a robustness condition which is both suf-
ficient and necessary. Here we set to confront both aspects of
this open problem by generalising the state-of-the-art classical
wisdom on certifiable adversarial robustness into the quantum
realm.
The pressing demand for robustness against adversarial at-
tacks is arguably even more self-evident under the classical
setting in the present era of wide-spread industrial adaptation
of machine learning [13, 14, 20]. Many heuristic defence
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2strategies have been proposed but have subsequently been
shown to fail against suitably powerful adversaries [21, 22].
In response, provable defence mechanisms that provide ro-
bustness guarantees have been developed. One line of work,
interval bound propagation, uses interval arithmetic [23, 24] to
certify neural networks. Another approach makes use of ran-
domizing inputs and adopts techniques from differential pri-
vacy [25] and, to our particular interest, statistical hypothesis
testing [26] which has a natural counter-part in the quantum
domain. Since the pioneering works by Helstrom [27] and
Holevo [28], the task of quantum hypothesis testing (QHT)
has been well-studied and regarded as one of the foundational
tasks in quantum information, with profound linkages with
topics ranging from quantum communication [29, 30], esti-
mation theory [31], to quantum illumination [32, 33].
In this work, we lay bare a fundamental connection be-
tween quantum hypothesis testing and the robustness of quan-
tum classifiers against unknown noise sources and derive a
robustness condition with provable tightness under modest as-
sumptions. Based on these theoretical findings, we provide an
optimal robustness certification protocol and demonstrate our
results with a single-qubit example. We will consider both
the deterministic and randomized quantum input settings, the
latter of which additionally depicts a quantum generalisation
to randomized smoothing, a technique that has recently been
applied to certify the robustness of classical machine learning
models [26]. The conceptual foundation of our approach is
rooted in the inherently probabilistic nature of quantum classi-
fiers. Intuitively, while QHT is concerned with the question of
how to optimally discriminate between two given states, cer-
tifying adversarial robustness aims at giving a guarantee for
which two states can not be discriminated. These two seem-
ingly contrasting notions go hand in hand and, as we will see,
give rise to optimal robustness conditions fully expressible in
the language of QHT. Furthermore, while we focus on robust-
ness in a worst-case scenario, our results naturally cover nar-
rower classes of known noise sources and can potentially be
put in context with other areas such as error mitigation and
error tolerance in NISQ era.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We
first introduce the notations and terminologies and review re-
sults from QHT essential for our purpose. We then proceed
to formally define quantum classifiers and the assumptions on
the threat model. In Section II, we present our main results
on provable robustness from quantum hypothesis testing. Our
findings are then demonstrated and visualised with a simple
toy example in Section III, in which we additionally consider
the randomized input setting and analyse specifically random-
ization with depolarization channel. Finally, in Section IV we
conclude with a higher-level discussion and layout several re-
lated open problems with an outlook for future research.
A. Preliminaries
1. Notations
Let H be a Hilbert space of finite dimension d :=
dim(H) < ∞ corresponding to the quantum system of in-
terest. The space of linear operators acting on H is denoted
by L(H) and the identity operator on H is written as 1. If
not clear from context, the dimensionality is explicitly indi-
cated through the notation 1d. The set of density operators
(i.e. positive semi-definite trace-one Hermitian matrices) act-
ing on H, is denoted by S(H) and elements of S(H) are
written in lowercase Greek letters. The Dirac notation will
be adopted whereby Hilbert space vectors are written as |ψ〉
and their dual as 〈ψ|. We will use the terminology density
operator and quantum state interchangeably. For two Hermi-
tian operators A, B ∈ L(H) we write A > B (A ≥ B) if
A − B is positive (semi-)definite and A < B (A ≤ B) if
A − B is negative (semi-)definite. For a Hermitian operator
A ∈ L(H) with spectral decomposition A = ∑i λiPi we
write {A > 0} := ∑i : λi>0 Pi (and analogously {A < 0} :=∑
i : λi<0
Pi) for the projection onto the eigenspace of A as-
sociated with positive (negative) eigenvalues. The Hermitian
transpose of an operator A is written as A† and the complex
conjugate of a scalar z ∈ C as z¯. For two density operators ρ
and σ, the trace distance is defined as T (ρ, σ) := 12 ‖ρ− σ‖1
where ‖·‖1 is the Schatten 1-norm defined on L(H) and given
by ‖A‖1 := Tr [|A|] with |A| =
√
A†A. The fidelity be-
tween density operators ρ and σ is denoted by F and defined
as F (ρ, σ) := Tr
[√√
ρσ
√
ρ
]2
which for pure states reduces
to the squared overlap F (|ψ〉 , |φ〉) = |〈ψ|φ〉|2.
2. Quantum hypothesis testing
Typically, QHT is formulated in terms of state discrimina-
tion where several quantum states have to be discriminated
through a measurement [27]. In binary quantum hypothesis
testing, the aim is to decide whether a given unknown quan-
tum system is in one of two states corresponding to the null
and alternative hypothesis. Any such test is represented by an
operator 0 ≤ M ≤ 1d, which corresponds to rejecting the
null in favor of the alternative. The two central quantities of
interest are the probabilities of making a type I or type II error.
The former corresponds to rejecting the null when it is true,
while the latter occurs if the null is accepted when the alter-
native is true. Specifically, for density operators σ ∈ S(H)
and ρ ∈ S(H) describing the null and alternative hypothesis,
the type-I error probability is defined as α(M) and the type-II
error probability as β(M), so that
α(M) := Tr [σM ] , β(M) := Tr [ρ(1−M)] . (1)
In symmetric hypothesis testing, one is concerned with find-
ing a test which minimizes the total error probability. In the
Bayesian setting, one is given prior probabilities pi0 and pi1
corresponding to the probabilities that the system has been
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FIG. 1: Schematic illustration of an adversarial attack. A quantum classifier correctly classifies the (highly toxic) mushroom as “death cap"
in a). In b), an adversary perturbs the image to fool the classifier into believing the image depicts “Caesar’s mushroom", which happens to be
edible. An adversarial attack of this sort, although not on a quantum computer, has reportedly led to the deaths of Roman Emperor Claudius
and Charles VI [34].
prepared either in state σ or ρ. A Bayes optimal test M is one
that minimizes the posterior probability pi0·α(M)+pi1·β(M).
In this paper, we consider asymmetric hypothesis testing,
where the two types of errors are associated with a different
cost. Given a maximal allowed probability for the type I error,
the goal is to minimize the probability of the type II error.
Specifically, one aims to solve the constrained optimization
problem
inf
α(M)≤α0
β(M) (2)
where the infimum is taken with respect to all measurement
operators 0 ≤ M ≤ 1d such that the corresponding type-I
error falls below the preassigned probability α0.
Optimal tests can be expressed in terms of projections onto
the eigenspaces of the operator ρ − tσ where t is a non-
negative number. More specifically, for t ≥ 0 let Pt,+ := {ρ−
tσ > 0}, Pt,− := {ρ−tσ < 0} and Pt,0 := 1−Pt,+−Pt,− be
the projections onto the eigenspaces of ρ− tσ associated with
positive, negative and zero eigenvalues. The quantum ana-
logue to the Neyman-Pearson Lemma [35] shows optimality
of operators of the form
Mt := Pt,+ +Xt, 0 ≤ Xt ≤ Pt,0. (3)
The choice of the number t ≥ 0 and the operator Xt is such
that the preassigned type-I error probability α0 is attained. An
explicit construction for these operators is based on the in-
equalities
α(Pτ(α0),+) ≤ α0 ≤ α(Pτ(α0),+ + Pτ(α0),0) (4)
where α0 ∈ (0, 1) and τ(α0) is the smallest non-negative
number such that α(Pτ(α0),+) ≤ α0, i.e. τ(α0) := inf{t ≥
0: α(Pt,+) ≤ α0}. These inequalities are justified by the ob-
servation that the function t 7→ α(Pt,+) is non-increasing and
right-continuous while t 7→ α(Pt,+ + Pt,0) is non-increasing
and left-continuous. A detailed proof for this may be found in
the supplementary materials, Section A 2. We will henceforth
refer to operators of the form (3) as Helstrom operators [31].
3. Quantum classifiers
We define a K-class quantum classifier of states of the
quantum system H described by density operators as a map
A : S(H) 7→ C which maps states σ ∈ S(H) to class labels
k ∈ C = {1, . . . , K}. Given a quantum state σ, we identify
the probability of measuring outcome k to be the class proba-
bility
σ 7→ yk(σ) ≡ Tr [ΠkE(σ)] (5)
where E is a quantum operation acting on the input state
which mathematically corresponds to a completely positive
trace-preserving (CPTP) map. We treat the positive-operator
valued measure (POVM) element Πk as a projector Πk =
|k〉 〈k| ⊗1d/K which determines whether the output is classi-
fied into class k. This can be done without loss of generality
by Naimark’s dilation since E is kept arbitrary and potentially
involves ancillary qubits and a general POVM element can be
expressed as a projector on the larger Hilbert space. The final
prediction is given by the most likely class
A(σ) ≡ arg max
k
yk(σ). (6)
In the context of quantum machine learning, the input state σ
can be an encoding of classical data by means of, for exam-
ple, amplitude encoding or otherwise [19, 36], or inherently
quantum input data, while E can be realized, for example, by
a trained parametrized quantum circuit potentially involving
ancillary registers [37]. However, it is worth noting that the
4above-defined notion of quantum classifier more generally de-
scribes the procedure of a broader class of quantum algorithms
whose output is obtained by repeated sampling of measure-
ment outcomes.
4. Quantum adversarial robustness
Adversarial examples are attacks on classification models
where an adversary aims to induce a misclassification using
typically imperceptible modifications of a benign input exam-
ple. Specifically, given a classifier A and a benign input state
σ, an adversary can craft a small perturbation σ → ρ which
results in a misclassification, i.e. A(ρ) 6= A(σ). An illustra-
tion for this threat scenario is given in FIG. 1. In this paper,
we seek a worst-case robustness guarantee against any possi-
ble attack: as long as ρ does not differ from σ by more than
a certain amount, then it is guaranteed that A(σ) = A(ρ) in-
dependently of how the adversarial state ρ has been crafted.
Formally, suppose the quantum classifier A takes as input a
benign quantum state σ ∈ S(H) and produces a measure-
ment outcome denoted by the class k ∈ C with probability
yk(σ) = Tr [ΠkE(σ)]. Recall that the prediction ofA is taken
to be the most likely class kA = arg maxk yk(σ). An adver-
sary aims to alter the output probability distribution so as to
change the most likely class by applying an arbitrary quantum
operation EA : S(H) → S(H) to σ resulting in the adver-
sarial state ρ = EA(σ). Finally, we say that the classifier
y is provably robust around σ with respect to the robustness
condition R, if for any ρ which satisfies R, it is guaranteed
that arg maxk yk(ρ) = arg maxk yk(σ). Typically, R is ex-
pressed explicitly in terms of trace distance or fidelity. How-
ever, as we shall see, it is also possible to formulate a con-
dition in terms of optimal type-II error probabilities which is
not always easily expressible with other distance measures.
Furthermore, we note that while we are interested in robust-
ness conditions on quantum states, the assumption that an ad-
versary can only act on quantum states is not needed for our
results to hold.
B. Summary of results
In this work, we establish a fundamental connection be-
tween QHT and the robustness of quantum classification al-
gorithms against adversarial input perturbations and derive a
robustness condition in terms of the errors of the optimal tests
to distinguish between the benign and adversarial states (QHT
condition: Theorem 1). Under certain practical assumptions
about the class probabilities on benign input, we prove that
the QHT condition is optimal (Theorem 2). We then show
the QHT condition, implicitly written in terms of the type-II
errors of optimal hypothesis tests at a preassigned type-I er-
ror probability, implies explicit robustness bounds in the form
of trace distances in the settings of pure benign and adver-
sarial states (Corollary 1), as well as pure benign and mixed
adversarial states (Corollary 2). We numerically compare an
alternative robustness bound directly implied by the definition
of trace distance and application of Hölder duality (Lemma 1
& Ref. [18]) with the explicit forms of the robustness bounds
arising from QHT (FIG. 2). Based on these technical findings.
We then provide a practical protocol for robustness certifica-
tion of quantum classifiers (Protocol 1). Finally, we instanti-
ate our results with a single-qubit pure state example both in
the deterministic (without randomizing inputs) and depolar-
ization smoothing input scenarios, which allows for numer-
ical comparison of all the known robustness bounds, arising
from Hölder duality, differential privacy [17] and QHT (FIG.
4). The technical results of our work and the state-of-the-art
of certifiable adversarial robustness of quantum classifiers are
summarized in TABLE I.
II. PROVABLY ROBUST QUANTUM CLASSIFICATION
WITH QUANTUM HYPOTHESIS TESTING
In this section, we present our main results. We will de-
rive a robustness condition for quantum classifiers with the
QHT formalism, which provides a provable guarantee for the
outcome of a computation being unaffected by the worst-case
input noise or perturbation under a given set of constraints. In
the regime where the most likely class is measured with prob-
ability lower bounded by pA > 1/2 and the runner up class is
not more likely than pB = 1 − pA, we prove tightness of the
robustness bound, hence demonstrating that the QHT condi-
tion is at least partially optimal. The QHT robustness condi-
tion, in its full generality, has an implicit form in terms of the
type-II error probabilities of the Helstrom measurement. We
simplify this condition and derive its explicit forms in terms
of the trace distance between benign and adversarial inputs.
In the scenarios of both input being pure states, the explicit
bound is equivalent to the implicit bound, and is hence prov-
ably tight when pA + pB = 1. In the scenarios of pure benign
and mixed adversarial inputs, the explicit robustness bound
occurs to be weaker. These results stemming from QHT con-
siderations are then contrasted and compared with an alterna-
tive approach which directly applies Hölder duality to trace
distances to obtain a sufficient robustness condition.
A. Robustness condition from quantum hypothesis testing
Recall that quantum hypothesis testing is concerned with
the question of finding measurements that optimally discrimi-
nate between two states. A measurement is said to be optimal
if it minimizes the probabilities of identifying the quantum
system to be in the state σ, corresponding to the null hypothe-
sis, when in fact it is in the alternative state ρ, and vice versa.
When considering provable robustness, on the other hand, one
aims to find a neighbourhood around a benign state σ where
the class which is most likely to be measured is constant or,
expressed differently, where the classifier can not discriminate
between states. It becomes thus clear that quantum hypothe-
sis testing and classification robustness aim to achieve a sim-
ilar goal, although viewed from different angles. Indeed, as
it turns out, QHT determines the robust region around σ to
5TABLE I: Summary of Results. Tightness in the regime where predicted class probabilities satisfy pA + pB = 1 implied by Theorem 2 is
indicated by †.
Input States
(Benign-Adversarial) Quantum Differential Privacy Hölder Duality
Quantum Hypothesis Testing
Implicita Explicitb
No Smoothing
Pure-Pure
— Lemma 1c Theorem 1†
Corollary 1†
Pure-Mixed Corollary 2
Depolarization
Smoothing
Pure-Pure
Lemma 2 in Ref. [17] Eq. (32) Theorem 1†
Eq. (30) (single-qubit)†
Pure-Mixed —
a Robustness condition expressed in terms of type-II error probabilities β associated with an optimal quantum hypothesis test.
b Robustness condition expressed in terms of trace distance T (ρ, σ).
c Independently discovered in Ref. [18].
be the point where the optimal discriminator has type-II error
> 1/2.
To establish this connection more formally, we identify the
benign state with the null hypothesis σ and the adversarial
state with the alternative ρ. We note that, in the Heisen-
berg picture, we can identify a classifier y with a POVM
{Πk}k. Additionally, let kA be the class of σ predicted by
y, i.e. kA = arg maxk Tr [Πkσ]. With this, the measure-
ment 1 − ΠkA (and thus the classifier y) can be viewed as
a hypothesis test discriminating between σ and ρ. Given a
lower bound pA ≤ Tr [ΠkAσ], asymmetric quantum hypothe-
sis testing delivers a an optimal test M∗A which has type-I er-
ror α(M∗A) = 1 − pA. Crucially, optimality implies that M∗A
minimizes the type-II error probability among all tests with
type-I error probability at most 1− pA and thus, in particular
ykA(ρ) = β(1−ΠkA) ≥ β(M∗A). Clearly, if β(M∗A) > 1/2,
then it is guaranteed that kA is the class of ρ that is most likely
to be predicted by y. The following theorem makes this rea-
soning concise and extends to the setting where additionally
the probability of measuring the second most likely class is
bounded from above by pB .
Theorem 1 (QHT robustness bound). Let σ, ρ ∈ S(H) be
benign and adversarial quantum states and let y be a quantum
classifier. Suppose that for kA ∈ C and pA, pB ∈ [0, 1] the
classifier y predicts class probabilities
ykA(σ) ≥ pA > pB ≥ max
k 6=kA
yk(σ). (7)
Let M∗A and M
∗
B be Helstrom operators for testing the null
σ against the alternative ρ with type-I error probabilities
α(M∗A) = 1 − pA and α(M∗B) = pB . Then, if the type-II
error probabilities satisfy
β(M∗A) + β(M
∗
B) > 1 (8)
it is guaranteed that kA = arg maxk yk(ρ), i.e. ykA(ρ) >
maxk 6=kA yk(ρ).
Proof (sketch). Here we provide the central intuitions gov-
erning the proof of our result and refer the reader to the
supplementary materials for details. Recall that β(M) :=
Tr [ρ(1−M)]. We first note that any classifier of the form (5)
can be written in the Heisenberg picture as yk(σ) = Tr[Πkσ]
where {Πk}k is a POVM. Since, in particular it holds that
0 ≤ Πk ≤ 1 for any k, the measurement defined by
{ΠkA , 1 − ΠkA} can thus be viewed as a quantum hypoth-
esis test. One then shows that for an operator 0 ≤M ≤ 1 and
a Helstrom operator Mt we have
α(M) ≥ 1− α(Mt)⇒ 1− β(M) ≥ β(Mt). (9)
Setting M = ΠkA , Mt = M
∗
A and using the fact that
α(M∗A) = 1− pA yields the inequality α(ΠkA) = ykA(σ) ≥
pA = 1− α(M∗A) and thus
ykA(ρ) = 1− β(ΠkA) ≥ β(M∗A). (10)
In a similar way, it is shown that for any k 6= kA we have
yk(ρ) ≤ 1 − β(M∗B). Robustness is thus guaranteed as long
as 1− β(M∗B) < β(M∗A).
To get some more intuition of Theorem 1, we first note that
for pB = 1− pA, the robustness condition (8) simplifies to
β(M∗A) > 1/2. (11)
With this, the relation between quantum hypothesis testing
and robustness becomes more evident: if the optimal hypoth-
esis test on average fails to distinguish the two states, then a
classifier will predict both states to belong to the same class.
In other words, viewing a classifier as a hypothesis test be-
tween the benign input σ and the adversarial ρ, the optimal-
ity of the Helstrom operators implies that the classifier y is
a worse discriminator and will also not distinguish the states,
or, phrased differently, it is robust. This result formalizes the
intuitive connection between quantum hypothesis testing and
robustness properties of quantum classifiers. While the for-
mer is concerned with finding operators that are optimal with
respect to discriminating two states, the latter is concerned
with finding conditions on states for which a classifier does
not discriminate.
B. Optimality
The robustness condition (8) from QHT is provably optimal
in the regime of pA + pB = 1, which covers binary classifi-
cations in full generality and multi-class classification where
6the most likely class is measured with probability larger than
pA >
1
2 . The robustness bound is tight in the sense that there
exists a classifier y∗ consistent with class probabilities on the
benign input but will classify the adversarial input incorrectly
if the condition (8) is violated. The following theorem demon-
strates this notion of tightness by explicitly constructing the
"worst-case" classifier.
Theorem 2 (QHT Robustness Condition Tightness). Given
pA + pB = 1, if the adversarial state ρ violates condition
(8), there exists a quantum classifier y∗ that is consistent with
the class probabilities (7) and for which arg maxk y∗k(ρ) 6=
arg maxk y
∗
k(σ).
Proof. Since pA + pB = 1, we have M∗A = M
∗
B . For kB 6=
kA, consider the operators ΠkA := 1−M∗A, ΠkB := M∗A, and
Πk 6=kA,kB = 0. Since 0 ≤ M∗1−pA ≤ 1, it follows that Πk ≥
0 for all k. It is clear that
∑
k Πk = 1. The set of operators{Πk}k is thus a POVM and we can define the classifier
S(H) 3 σ′ 7→ y∗k(σ′) = Tr [σ′Πk] ∀ k = 1, . . . , K. (12)
Note that y∗ is consistent with the class probabilities pA, pB
since y∗kA(σ) = Tr [σ(1−M∗A)] = pA ≥ pB and pB =
α(M∗A) = y
∗
kB
(σ) = maxk 6=kA y
∗
k(σ). On the other hand, if
the robustness condition is violated, we have β(M∗A) < 1 −
β(M∗B) ⇐⇒ Tr [ρ(1−M∗A)] < Tr [ρM∗A] ⇐⇒ y∗kA(ρ) <
ykB (ρ), thus arg maxk y
∗
k(ρ) 6= kA.
Whether or not the QHT robustness condition is tight for
pA + pB < 1 is an interesting open question for future re-
search. It turns out that a worst-case classifier that is consis-
tent with pA and pB for benign input but leads to misclassi-
fication on adversarial input upon violating condition (8), if
exists, is more challenging to construct for this cases. If such
a tightness for all class probabilities regime would be proven,
there would be a complete characterization for the robustness
of quantum classifiers. On the other hand, a negative result
would mean that robustness bounds based on statistical hy-
pothesis testing can be improved for quantum classifiers in the
regime of pA+pB < 1 but is generally tight for classical clas-
sifiers, which would reveal an intriguing quantum distinction
from its classical counterpart, and that, albeit in a somewhat
contrived sense, quantum classifiers could be more robust than
classical ones in these regimes.
C. Robustness bounds in terms of trace distance
1. QHT robustness bounds
Although Theorem 1 provides a general condition for ro-
bustness with provable tightness, it is formulated somewhat
implicitly in terms of type-II error probabilities of QHT. To
gain a more intuitive and operationally convenient perspec-
tive, we wish to derive a condition for robustness in terms
of the canonical measure of the difference between quantum
states, namely the trace distance between σ and ρ. Assuming
that the benign and adversarial states are both pure states, an
explicit robustness condition in terms of the trace distance can
be derived as a corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 (Pure Benign & Pure Adversarial States). If σ
and ρ are pure states then the robustness condition (8) is
equivalent to
T (ρ, σ) <
√
1− f(pA, pB)
2
(13)
where T (ρ, σ) = 12‖ρ− σ‖1 is the trace distance between the
benign and adversarial states, and
f(pA, pB) =
{
1− pB − pA(1− 2pB)
+ 2
√
pApB(1− pA)(1− pB)
} 1
2
(14)
Proof (sketch). Here we present a sketch of the main proof
idea and refer the reader to the supplementary materials for
details. The key challenge to proving this Corollary is con-
necting the robustness condition (8), written in terms of type-
II error probabilities, to the trace distance T (ρ, σ) between ρ
and σ. The first step is then to solve the eigenvalue problem
(ρ− tσ) |η〉 = η |η〉 (15)
which, for pure states, can be expressed in terms of the fideli-
tiy F (ρ, σ) between ρ and σ. Given these solutions, one then
derives an expression for the Helstrom operatorsM∗A andM
∗
B .
This leads to the condition β(M∗A) + β(M
∗
B) > 1 being an
inequality which can be solved explicitly for the fidelity. Fi-
nally, since for pure states the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities
yields an equality, the fidelity is related to the trace distance
with T (ρ, σ) =
√
1− F (ρ, σ). The derived condition on the
fidelity can hence be written as a bound in the trace distance
which has the form (13).
The robustness condition (13) in the above is both suffi-
cient and necessary (in the regime of pA + pB = 1), as it is
exactly equivalent to Theorem 1 for pure benign and adversar-
ial states. In the following Corollary, we generalise the tight,
explicit robustness condition for pure states to derive a suffi-
cient robustness condition for cases where adversarial states
are allowed to be mixed:
Corollary 2 (Pure Benign & Mixed Adversarial States). If
σ = |σ〉〈σ| is a pure state but ρ can be a mixed state, then
the robustness condition (8) implies the following sufficient
condition for robustness, i.e. kA = arg maxk yk(ρ):
T (ρ, σ) < δ(pA, pB)
(
1−
√
1− δ(pA, pB)2
)
, (16)
where δ(pA, pB) =
√
1−f(pA,pB)
2 .
Proof. See Supplementary Materials.
7Intuitively, condition (16) is derived by noting that any con-
vex mixture of robust pure states must also be robust, thus
membership of the set of mixed states enclosed by the convex
hull of robust pure states (certified by Corollary 1) is a natural
sufficient condition for robustness. As such, the correspond-
ing robustness radius in condition (16) is obtained by lower-
bounding, with triangle inequalities, the radius of the maximal
sphere centered at σ within the convex hull. However, the gen-
eralization from Corollary 1 to Corollary 2, mediated by the
above geometrical argument, results in a sacrifice of tightness.
How or to what extent such loosening of the explicit bound in
the cases of mixed states may be avoided or ameliorated re-
mains an open question. In the following, we compare both
explicit bounds from QHT with a robustness condition derived
from an entirely different technique.
2. Hölder duality robustness bound
We note that a sufficient condition can be obtained from
a somewhat straightforward application of Hölder duality for
trace norms:
Lemma 1 (Hölder duality bound). Let σ, ρ ∈ S(H) be ar-
bitrary quantum states. If the trace distance of ρ and σ is
bounded by
1
2
‖ρ− σ‖1 <
pA − pB
2
(17)
where pA and pB are bounds to the class probabilities that
satisfy ykA(σ) ≥ pA > pB ≥ maxk 6=kA yk(σ), then we have
that
ykA(ρ) > max
k 6=kA
yk(ρ). (18)
Proof. Let δ := 12‖ρ−σ‖1 = sup0≤P≤I Tr[P (ρ− σ)], which
follows from Hölder duality. We have that ykA(σ)−ykA(ρ) ≤
δ and that ykA(σ) ≥ pA, hence ykA(ρ) ≥ pA − δ. We also
have, for k′ such that yk′(ρ) = maxk 6=kA yk(ρ), that yk′(ρ)−
yk′(σ) ≤ δ and that yk′(σ) ≤ pB , hence maxk 6=kA yk(ρ) ≤
pB + δ. Thus 12 ‖ρ− σ‖1 < pA−pB2 ⇐⇒ pA − δ > pB +
δ =⇒ ykA(ρ) > maxk 6=kA yk(ρ).
We acknowledge the above robustness bound from Hölder
duality was independently discovered in Lemma 1 of Ref.
[18]. For intuitive insights, it is worth remarking that the
condition (17) stems from comparing the maximum proba-
bility of distinguishing σ and ρ with the optimal measurement
(Hölder measurement) with the gap between the first two class
probabilities on σ. Since no classifier can distinguish σ and
ρ better than the Hölder measurement by definition, (17) is
clearly a sufficient condition. However, the Hölder measure-
ment on σ does not necessarily result in class probabilities
consistent with eq. (7). Without additional constraints on de-
sired class probabilities on the benign input, the robustness
condition (17) from Hölder duality is stronger than necessary.
In contrast, the QHT bound from Theorem 1, albeit implicitly
written in the language of hypothesis testing, naturally incor-
porates such desired constraints. Hence this gives rise to a
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FIG. 2: Comparison between robustness bounds in terms of trace
distance. Figure a) depicts the difference RQHT1 − RHölder between
the pure state bound derived from QHT and presented in Corollary 1
and the Hölder duality bound from Lemma 1. Figure b) shows the
differenceRHölder−RQHT2 between the Hölder duality bound derived
from the convex hull approximation to the QHT robustness condition
from Theorem 1 for mixed adversarial states. It can be seen that the
pure state bound RQHT1 is always larger than R
Hölder which in turn is
always larger than the convex hull approximation bound RQHT2 .
tighter robustness condition as expected. Explicitly in terms
of trace distances, the tightness of Theorem 1 is completely
inherited from Corollary 1, for the case of pure state inputs
but partially lost in Corollary 2, for the case of pure benign
and mixed adversarial input. The numerical comparison be-
tween the explicit forms of the QHT bound (in terms of trace
distances) and the Hölder duality bound is shown in a contour
plot in FIG 2.
D. Robustness certification protocol
Certifying the robustness of a quantum classifier y around a
benign input state σ requires one to (1) identify the most likely
class kA, and (2) in the finite sampling regime, one has to
estimate a lower bound pA on the most likely class probability
and an upper bound pB on the probability of the second most
likely class.
Specifically, given an error tolerance ε, one samples the
quantum circuit N times to obtain the estimates
pA = yˆ
(N)
kA
(σ)−
√
− log(ε)
2N
,
pB = yˆ
(N)
kB
(σ) +
√
− log(ε)
2N
.
(19)
Hoeffding’s inequality then implies that with probability 1−ε
the true class scores ykA(σ) and ykB (σ) are lower and upper
bounded by pA and pB . The procedure to obtain a robustness
certificate for y around a pure input σ is presented in Proto-
col 1. The version presented here only certifies input states σ
for which we have pA > 1/2 so that we can set pB = 1− pA.
However, this procedure is easily extended to the general set-
ting. With the same procedure it is also possible to obtain cer-
tificates for mixed adversarial states by employing the Hölder
duality bound from Lemma 1.
8Protocol 1 Robustness Certification(σ, N, ε, A)
Input: Pure quantum state σ ∈ S(H), number of measure-
ment shots N , error tolerance ε, a quantum classifier A =
(E , {Πk}k∈C).
Output: Predicted class kA, prediction score pA and robust radius
RQHT1 in trace distance.
1: Set counter nk = 0 for every k ∈ C.
2: for k = 1, . . . N do
3: Apply quantum circuit E to initial state σ.
4: Perform |C|-outcome measurement {Πk}k∈C on the evolved
state E(σ).
5: Record measurement outcome k by setting nk ← nk + 1.
6: end for
7: Calculate empirical probability distribution yˆ(N)k = nkN
−1.
8: Extract the most likely class kA = arg maxk yˆ
(N)
k .
9: Set pA = yˆ
(N)
kA
(σ)−
√
− log(ε)
2N
.
10: if pA > 1/2 then
11: Calculate robust radius RQHT1 =
√
1
2
−√pA(1− pA).
12: return prediction kA, class score pA, robust radius RQHT1 .
13: else
14: return ABSTAIN
15: end if
III. TOY EXAMPLE & RANDOMIZED INPUTS
A. Toy example with single-qubit pure states
We now present a simple example to highlight the connec-
tion between quantum hypothesis testing and classification ro-
bustness. We consider a single-qubit system which is prepared
either in the state σ or ρ described by
|σ〉 = |0〉 , |ρ〉 = cos(θ0/2) |0〉+ sin(θ0/2)eiφ0 |1〉 (20)
with θ0 ∈ [0, pi) and φ0 ∈ [0, 2pi). The state σ corresponds
to the null hypothesis in the QHT setting and to the benign
state in the classification setting. Similarly, ρ corresponds to
the alternative hypothesis and adversarial state. The operators
which are central to both QHT and robustness are the Hel-
strom operators (3) which are derived from the projection op-
erators onto the eigenspaces associated with the non-negative
eigenvalues of the operator ρ−tσ. For this example, the eigen-
values are functions of t ≥ 0 and given by
η1 =
1
2
(1− t) +R > 0, η2 = 1
2
(1− t)−R ≤ 0
R =
1
2
√
(1− t)2 + 4t(1− |γ|2)
(21)
where γ is the overlap between σ and ρ and given by γ =
cos(θ0/2). For t > 0, the Helstrom operators are then
given by the projection onto the eigenspace associated with
the eigenvalue η1 > 0. The projection operator is given by
Mt = |η1〉〈η1| with
|η1〉 = (1− η1)A1 |0〉 − γA1 |ρ〉
|A1|−2 = 2R
∣∣η1 − sin2(θ0/2)∣∣ (22)
FIG. 3: Example classifier for single-qubit quantum states. The de-
cision boundary is represented by the grey disk passing through the
origin of the Bloch sphere. Robust regions are indicated by the blue
and orange spherical caps. Blue (orange) states correspond to class-0
(class-1) data points which are correctly classified, while red states
are misclassified. For the given classifier, the state ρ is not contained
in the robust region around σ and is thus not guaranteed to be classi-
fied correctly by every classifier with the same class probabilities. In
the asymmetric hypothesis testing view, an optimal discriminator for
testing σ against ρ and which admits 0.1 type-I error probability has
type-II error probability 0.44.
whereA1 is normalization constant ensuring that 〈η1|η1〉 = 1.
Given a preassigned probability α0 for the maximal allowed
type-I error probability, we determine t such that α(Mt) =
α(|η1〉〈η1|) = α0 is satisfied.
1. Hypothesis testing view
In QHT we are given a specific alternative hypothesis ρ and
error probability α0 and are interested in finding the minimal
type-II error probability. In this example, we pick θ0 = pi/3,
φ0 = −pi/2 and set the type-I error probability to α0 = 1 −
pA = 0.1. For this choice of states, we obtain an expression
for the eigenvector |η1〉 given by
|η1〉 = 9−
√
3√
30
|0〉 − 3
√
2
5
|ρ〉 . (23)
which yields the type-II error probability
β(Mt) = 1− |〈η1|ρ〉|2 ≈ 0.44 < 1/2. (24)
We thus see that the optimal hypothesis test can discriminate
σ and ρ with error probabilities less than 1/2 since on the
Bloch sphere they are located far enough apart. However,
since β(Mt) ≯ 1/2, Theorem 1 implies that ρ is not guaran-
teed to be classified equally as σ by a classifier which makes
a prediction on σ with confidence at least 0.9. In other words,
9the two states are far enough apart to be easily discriminated
by the optimal hypothesis test but too far apart to be guaran-
teed to be robust.
2. Classification robustness view
In this scenario, in contrast to the QHT view, we are not
given a specific adversarial state ρ, but rather wish to find a
condition on ρ such that the classifier is robust for all ρ that
satisfy this condition. Theorems 1 and 2 provide a necessary
and sufficient condition for robustness, expressed in terms of
β, which reads
β(M∗A) > 1/2 (25)
where M∗A is a Helstrom operator with α(M
∗
A) = 1 − pA
and pA > 1/2 is a lower bound to the probability of the most
likely class. For example, as the QHT view shows, for α0 =
1− pA = 0.1 we have that β ≈ 0.44 < 1/2 for a state ρ with
θ0 = pi/3. We thus see that it is not guaranteed that every
quantum classifier, which predicts σ to be of class kA with
probability 0.9, classifies ρ to be of the same class. We would
now like to find the maximum θ0, for which every classifier
with confidence greater than pA is guaranteed to classify ρ and
σ equally. Since both states are pure, we can use the condition
on the fidelity—which is equivalent to β(M∗A) > 1/2—and
obtain a bound on θ0 so that
|〈ρ|σ〉| = cos2(θ0/2) > 1
2
+
√
pA(1− pA)
⇐⇒ θ0 < 2 · arccos
√
1
2
+
√
pA(1− pA).
(26)
In particular, if pA = 0.9, we find that angles θ0 < 2 ·
arccos(
√
0.8) ≈ 0.93 < pi/3 are certified. Figure 3 illustrates
this scenario: the blue region around σ contains all states for
which any classifier with confidence at least 0.9 will make a
prediction consistent with σ.
3. Classifier example
We consider a binary quantum classifier y which discrimi-
nates single-qubit states living on the upper (class 0) and lower
(class 1) hemispheres of the Bloch sphere. Specifically, we
consider the POVM {Πθ,φ, 12−Πθ,φ} defined by the projec-
tion operator Πθ,φ = |ψθ,φ〉〈ψθ,φ| where
|ψθ,φ〉 := cos(θ/2) |0〉+ sin(θ/2)eiφ |1〉 (27)
with θ = 2 · arccos(√0.9) ≈ 0.644 and φ = pi/2. Further-
more, for the rest of this section, we assume that pA+pB = 1
so that pB is determined by pA via pB = 1− pA. An illustra-
tion of this classification problem is given in Figure 3, where
the decision boundary of y is represented by the grey disk
crossing the origin of the Bloch sphere. The blue states cor-
respond to class-0 states which have been classified correctly,
orange states correspond to data points correctly classified as 1
and red states are misclassified by y. It can be seen that, since
the state ρ has been shown to violate the robustness condition
(i.e. β(M∗A) ≈ 0.44 < 1/2), it is not guaranteed to be classify
ρ and σ equally. In particular, the classifier y misclassifies ρ.
In summary, as pA → 12 , the robust radius approaches 0. In
the QHT view, this can be interpreted in the sense that if the
type-I error probability α0 approaches 1/2, then all alternative
states can be discriminated from σ with type-II error probabil-
ity less than 1/2. As pA → 1, the robust radius approaches
pi/2. In this regime, the QHT view says that if the type-I error
probability α0 approaches 0, then the corresponding Helstrom
operator will admit a type-II error probability smaller than 1/2
only for states in the lower half of the Bloch sphere.
B. Randomized inputs with depolarization smoothing
Here we briefly discuss randomized input scenarios, led by
the intuition that noise can be exploited to increase robust-
ness and privacy. We first provide background on randomized
smoothing, a technique for provable robustness from classical
machine learning. We then proceed to present provable ro-
bustness in terms of trace distance which is equivalent to the
robustness condition (8) from Theorem 1 but with random-
ized inputs. The bound is then compared numerically with
the Hölder duality bound from Lemma 1 and with a result ob-
tained recently from quantum differential privacy [17].
1. Background: randomized smoothing
Randomized Smoothing is a technique that has recently
been proposed to certify the robustness and obtains tight prov-
able robustness guarantees in the classical setting [26]. The
key idea is to randomize inputs to classifiers by perturbing
them with additive Gaussian noise. This results in smoother
decision boundaries which in turn leads to improved robust-
ness to adversarial attacks. In this section, we extend this
concept to the quantum setting by interpreting quantum noise
channels as “smoothing" channels. The idea of harnessing ac-
tively induced input noise in quantum classifiers to increase
robustness has recently been proposed in Ref. [17] where ro-
bustness bound with techniques from differential privacy has
been derived. In the following, we take a similar path and con-
sider a depolarization noise channel and analytically derive a
larger robustness radius for pure single-qubit input states.
2. Quantum channel smoothing: depolarization
Consider depolarization noise which maps a state σ onto a
linear combination of itself and the maximally mixed state
σ 7→ Edepp (σ) := (1− p)σ +
p
d
1d (28)
where p ∈ (0, 1) is the depolarization parameter and d is
the dimensionality of the underlying Hilbert space. In single-
qubit scenarios, this can geometrically be interpreted as a uni-
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form contraction of the Bloch sphere parametrized by p, push-
ing quantum states towards the completely mixed state. Anal-
ogously to classical randomized smoothing, we apply a depo-
larization channel to inputs before passing them through the
classifier in order to artificially randomize the states and in-
crease robustness against adversarial attacks. We then obtain
a robustness guarantee by instantiating Theorem 1 in the fol-
lowing way. Let σ be a benign input state and suppose that the
classifier y outputs class probabilities which satisfy
ykA(Edepp (σ)) ≥ pA > pB ≥ max
k 6=kA
yk(Edepp (σ)). (29)
Then y is robust at Edepp (ρ) for any adversarial input state
ρ which satisfies the robustness condition (8), where M∗A
and M∗B are Helstrom operators for testing Edepp (σ) against
Edepp (ρ) and which have false alaram probabilities 1− pA and
pB respectively. In particular, if σ and ρ are single-qubit pure
states and in the case where we have pA+pB = 1, the robust-
ness condition can be equivalently expressed in terms of the
trace distance as T (ρ, σ) < RQHTp with
RQHTp =

√
1
2 −
√
gp(pA)
1−p , pA <
1+3(1−p)2
2+2(1−p)2√
p·(2−p)·(1−2pA)2
8(1−p)2·(1−pA) , pA ≥
1+3·(1−p)2
2+2·(1−p)2
(30)
where
gp(pA) =
1
2
(
2pA(1− pA)− p(1− p
2
)
)
. (31)
A detailed derivation of this bound is given in Corollary 3 in
the supplementary materials.
The Hölder bound from Lemma 1 can also be adapted to
the noisy setting. Specifically, since for two states σ and ρ, the
trace distance obeys T (Edepp (ρ), Edepp (σ)) = (1−p)·T (ρ, σ),
Lemma 1 implies robustness given that the trace distance is
less than T (ρ, σ) < RHölderp where
RHölderp =
2pA − 1
2(1− p) . (32)
In [17] it has been shown that naturally occurring noise in
a quantum circuit can be harnessed to increase the robustness
of quantum classification algorithms. Specifically, using tech-
niques from quantum differential privacy, a robustness bound
expressible in terms of the class probabilities pA and the de-
polarization parameter p has been derived. Written in our no-
tation and for single-qubit binary classification, the bound can
be written as
RDPp =
p
2(1− p)
(√
pA
1− pA − 1
)
(33)
and robustness is guaranteed for any adversarial state ρ with
T (ρ, σ) < RDPp . In FIG 4 the three bounds are com-
pared graphically for different values of the noise parameter
p, showing that the QHT bound gives rise to a tighter robust-
ness condition for all values of p.
Additionally, we note that in the presence of depolarization
noise, the robust regions can cover the entire Bloch sphere if
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FIG. 4: Comparison of Robustness bounds for single-qubit pure
states derived from quantum hypothesis testing RQHTp , Hölder dual-
ity RHölderp and quantum differential privacy RDPp [17] with different
levels of depolarization noise p.
pA is large enough and the robust radius (in terms of trace dis-
tance) becomes 1. In particular, from FIG. 4 we can see that as
the depolarization parameter p increases, the prediction con-
fidence pA at which the robust radius is 1, decreases. This
indicates that as the input approaches the maximally mixed
state, it becomes harder for classifiers to distinguish between
states. The fact that the robust radius can cover the entire
Bloch sphere, implies that if a quantum classifier becomes
“too confident" in classifying a given input state, it will be
constant, hinting at a fundamental limitation on the ability of
quantum classifiers to distinguish between different classes of
states.
It is worth remarking that although the QHT robustness
bound can be, as shown here for the case of applying depo-
larization channel, enhanced by input randomization, it al-
ready presents a valid, non-trivial condition with deterministic
(without smoothing) quantum input (Theorem 1). This con-
trasts with the classical scenario, where the addition of classi-
cal noise sources to the input state is necessary to generate a
probability distribution corresponding to the input data, from
which an adversarial robustness bound can be derived [26].
This distinction between the quantum and classical settings
roots in the probabilistic nature of measurements on quantum
states, which of course applies to both pure and mixed state
inputs.
IV. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
We have seen how a fundamental connection between ad-
versarial robustness of quantum classifiers and quantum hy-
pothesis testing (QHT) can be leveraged to provide a pow-
erful framework for deriving optimal conditions for robust-
ness certification. This also gives rise to a practical robustness
certification protocol. This robustness condition is provably
tight when expressed in terms of error rates of QHT for bi-
nary classifications, or more generally for all classifications in
which the probability of the most likely class is greater than
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1/2. When expressed explicitly in terms of trace distances, the
QHT robustness bound is proved to be tight when the input
states are pure. Furthermore, we have shown how using a ran-
domized input with depolarization channel enhances the QHT
bound, consistent with previous results, in a manner akin to
randomized smoothing in robustness certification of classical
machine learning.
A key difference between the quantum and classical formal-
ism is that quantum states themselves have a naturally proba-
bilistic interpretation, even though the classical data that could
be embedded in quantum states do not need to be probabilistic.
This difference is an important source of potential quantum
advantage in adversarial robustness. We now know that both
classical and quantum optimal robustness bounds for classi-
fication protocols depend on bounds provided by hypothesis
testing. However, hypothesis testing involves the comparison
of probability distributions, which can only be possible in the
classical case with the addition of stochastic noise sources if
the classical data is initially non-stochastic. This means that
the optimal robustness bounds in the classical case only exist
for noisy classifiers which also require training under the addi-
tional noise [26]. This is in contrast to the quantum scenario.
Our quantum adversarial robustness bound can be proved in-
dependently of randomized input, even though it can be en-
hanced by it, like through a depolarization channel. Thus in
the quantum regime, unlike in the classical scenario, we are
not forced to consider training under actively induced noise.
Our optimal provable robustness bound and the connec-
tion to quantum hypothesis testing also provides a first step
towards more rigorously identifying the limitations of quan-
tum classifiers in its power of distinguishing between input
quantum states. Our formalism hints at an intimate relation-
ship between these fundamental limitations in the accuracy of
distinguishing between different classes of states and robust-
ness. This could shed light on the robustness and accuracy
trade-offs observed in classification protocols [38] and is an
important direction of future research. It is also of indepen-
dent interest to explore possible connections between tasks
that use quantum hypothesis testing, such as quantum illumi-
nation [32] and state discrimination [39], with accuracy and
robustness in quantum classification.
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Appendix A: Supplementary Materials
Here we provide all proofs for the theoretical results presented in the main part. We first show a collection of technical lemmas
related to quantum hypothesis testing with the goal of explicitly constructing Helstrom operators which attain a preassigned level
of type-I error probability. Given this construction, we then proceed to prove Theorem 1 and derive the robustness bounds in
terms of trace distance for pure-pure and pure-mixed benign and adversarial quantum states presented in Corollaries 1 and 2.
Finally, we formally derive the robustness bound for noisy input scenarios discussed in Section III B.
1. Preliminaries
The proofs for our results are largely expressed in the language of quantum hypothesis testing. For that purpose, we first
recall the central quantities of interest. As in the main part of this paper, the null hypothesis corresponds to a benign input
state and is described by a density operator σ ∈ S(H) acting on a Hilbert space H of finite dimension d := dim(H) < ∞.
The density operator for the alternative hypothesis is denoted by ρ and corresponds the adversarial state in the classification
setting. A quantum hypothesis test is defined by a positive semi-definite operator 0 ≤ M ≤ 1d and the type-I and type-II error
probabilities associated with M are denoted by α and β and are defined by
α(M) := Tr [σM ] , β(M) := Tr [ρ(1−M)] . (A1)
For two Hermitian operators A and B, we write A ≥ B (A ≤ B) if A − B is positive (negative) semi-definite and A > B
(A < B) if A − B is positive (negative) definite. For a Hermitian operator A with spectral decomposition A = ∑i λiPi with
eigenvalues {λi}i and orthogonal projections onto the associated eigenspaces {Pi}i, we write
{A > 0} :=
∑
i : λi>0
Pi, {A < 0} :=
∑
i : λi<0
Pi (A2)
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for the projections onto the eigenspaces associated with positive and negative eigenvalues respectively. Finally, for t ≥ 0 define
the operators
Pt,+ := {ρ− tσ > 0}, Pt,− := {ρ− tσ < 0}, Pt,0 := 1− Pt,+ − Pt,−. (A3)
The Helstrom operators are then defined as
Mt := Pt,+ +Xt, 0 ≤ Xt ≤ Pt,0. (A4)
2. Technical Lemmas
The following Lemmas justify the existence and give an explicit construction of Helstrom operators attaining a preassigned
level of type-I error probability α0. We first show that if a sequence of bounded Hermitian operators An converges in operator
norm to a bounded Hermitian operator A from above (below), then the projection {An < 0} ({An > 0}) converges to {A < 0}
({A > 0}) in operator norm. This subsequently allows us to show that the function t 7→ α(Pt,+) is non-increasing and
continuous from the right, and that t 7→ α(Pt,+ + Pt,0) is non-increasing and continuous from the left. As a consequence, for
α0 ∈ (0, 1), the quantity
τ(α0) := inf{t ≥ 0: α(Pt,+) ≤ α0} (A5)
is well defined. This implies the chain of inequalities
α
(
Pτ(α0),+
) ≤ α0 ≤ α (Pτ(α0),+ + Pτ(α0),0) . (A6)
Based on this, we construct a Helstrom operator Mτ(α0) according to
Mτ(α0) := Pτ(α0),+ + q0Pτ(α0),0, q0 :=
{
α0−α(Pτ(α0),+)
α(Pτ(α0),0)
if α
(
Pτ(α0),0
) 6= 0,
0 otherwise.
(A7)
which attains the preassigned type-I error probability α0.
Lemma 2. Denote by B(H) the space of bounded linear operators acting on the finite dimensional Hilbert space H, d :=
dim(H) <∞. Let A ∈ B(H) and {An}n∈N ⊂ B(H) be Hermitian operators and suppose that ‖An −A‖op n→∞−−−−→ 0. Then, it
holds that
(i) A−An ≤ 0 ⇒ ‖{An < 0} − {A < 0}‖op n→∞−−−−→ 0, (A8)
(ii) A−An ≥ 0 ⇒ ‖{An > 0} − {A > 0}‖op n→∞−−−−→ 0. (A9)
Proof. We first show that convergence in operator norm implies that the eigenvalues of An converge towards the eigenvalues A.
For a linear operator M let λk(M) denote its k-th largest eigenvalue, λ1(M) ≥ . . . ≥ λq(M), where q ≤ d is the number of
distinct eigenvalues of M . By the minimax principle (e.g. [40], chapter 3), we can compute λk for any Hermitian operator M
according to
λk(M) = max
V⊆H
dim(V )=k
min
ψ∈V
‖ψ‖=1
〈ψ|M |ψ〉 . (A10)
Now let ε > 0 and let n ∈ N large enough such that ‖An −A‖op < ε. Let |ψ〉 ∈ H be a normalized state and note that by the
Cauchy-Schwartz inequality we have
|〈ψ| (An −A) |ψ〉| ≤ ‖(An −A)ψ‖ ‖ψ‖ ≤ ‖An −A‖op ‖ψ‖2 < ε (A11)
and thus
〈ψ|A |ψ〉 − ε < 〈ψ|An |ψ〉 < 〈ψ|A |ψ〉+ ε. (A12)
Hence, for any fixed k ≥ 1 and any subspace V ⊂ H with dim(V ) = k, we have
min
ψ∈V
‖ψ‖=1
〈ψ|A |ψ〉 − ε < min
ψ∈V
‖ψ‖=1
〈ψ|An |ψ〉 < min
ψ∈V
‖ψ‖=1
〈ψ|A |ψ〉+ ε (A13)
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and thus, from (A10), we see that
λk(A)− ε < λk(An) < λk(A)− ε⇒ |λk(A)− λk(An)| < ε (A14)
and hence
λk(An)
n→∞−−−−→ λk(A), k = 1, . . . , q. (A15)
Alternatively, this can be seen from Weyl’s Perturbation Theorem (e.g. [40], ch. 3): namely, since A and An are Hermitian, it
follows immediately from |λk(A)− λk(An)| ≤ maxk |λk(A)− λk(An)| ≤ ‖A−An‖op that eigenvalues converge provided
that ‖An −A‖op → 0. We will now make use of function theory and the resolvent formalism to show the convergence of the
positive and negative eigenprojections. LetM ∈ B(H) be Hermitian, let σ(M) denote the spectrum ofM and, for λ ∈ C\σ(M),
let
Rλ(M) := (M − λ1)−1 = −
∞∑
k=0
λ−(k+1)Mk (A16)
be the resolvent of the operator M . The sum is the Neumann series and converges for λ ∈ C \σ(M). Since M is Hermitian, we
can write its spectral decomposition in terms of contour integrals over the resolvent
M =
q∑
k=1
λk(M)Pk with Pk =
1
2pii
∮
(γk,−)
Rλ(M) dλ, and
q∑
k=1
Pk = 1 (A17)
where Pk is the orthogonal projection onto the k-th eigenspace and the integration is to be understood element-wise. The
symbol (γk,−) indicates that the contour encircles λk(M) once negatively, but does not encircle any other eigenvalue of M .
We refer the reader to [41] for a detailed derivation.
We now show part (i) of the Lemma. For ease of notation, let λk denote the k-th eigenvalue of A and λk,n the k-th eigenvalue
of An. Since An and A are Hermitian operators, we can write the eigenprojections {An < 0} and {A < 0} in terms of the
resolvent as
{A < 0} = 1
2pii
∑
k : λk<0
∮
(γk,−)
Rλ(A) dλ, {An < 0} = 1
2pii
∑
k : λk,n<0
∮
(γk,n,−)
Rλ(An) dλ (A18)
where the symbols (γk,−) and (γk,n,−) indicate that the contours encircle only λk and λk,n once negatively and no other eigen-
values of A and An respectively. Since by assumption An ≥ A and An, A are Hermitian, it follows from Weyl’s Monotonicity
Theorem that λk,n ≥ λk. Let λK be the largest negative eigenvalue of A, that is λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . λK−1 ≥ 0 > λK ≥ . . . ≥ λq .
Note that if A is positive semidefinite, then so is An and the statement follows trivially from {An < 0} = {A < 0} = 0.
Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that at least one eigenvalue of A is negative. Since λk,n ≥ λk, and in particular
λK−1,n ≥ λK−1 ≥ 0, there exists N0 ∈ N large enough such that λK−1,n ≥ 0 > λK,n for all n ≥ N0. Let r0 be the smallest
distance between two eigenvalues of A
r0 := min
k
|λk − λk+1| (A19)
and let 0 < ε < r02 . Choose N1 ≥ N0 large enough such that maxk≥K |λk,n − λk| < ε/2. Let 0 < δ < r02 − ε and for k ≥ K
let Bkδ+ε := Bδ+ε(λk) be the open ball of radius δ + ε centered at λk. Note that ∂B
k
δ+ε encircles both λk,n and λk. Then, for
k ≥ K and n ≥ N1, the mappings
λ 7→ Rλ(A), λ ∈ Bkδ+ε \ {λk}, (A20)
λ 7→ Rλ(An), λ ∈ Bkδ+ε \ {λk,n} (A21)
are holomorphic functions of λ and each has an isolated (simple) singularity at λk and λk,n respectively. Let γk,n be a contour
around λk,n encircling no other eigenvalue of An. Note that the contours γk,n and ∂Bkδ+ε are homotopic (in B
k
δ+ε \ {λk,n}).
Thus, for all k ≥ K and n ≥ N1, Cauchy’s integral Theorem yields∮
γk,n
Rλ(An) dλ =
∮
∂Bkδ+ε
Rλ(An) dλ. (A22)
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With this, we see that for n ≥ N1
{An < 0} − {A < 0} = 1
2pii
q∑
k=K
(∮
∂Bkδ+ε
Rλ(A) dλ−
∮
γk,n
Rλ(An) dλ
)
(A23)
=
1
2pii
q∑
k=K
(∮
∂Bkδ+ε
(Rλ(A)−Rλ(An)) dλ
)
(A24)
and thus, by the triangle inequality
‖{An < 0} − {A < 0}‖op ≤
1
2pi
q∑
k=K
∥∥∥∥∥
∮
∂Bkδ+ε
(Rλ(A)−Rλ(An)) dλ
∥∥∥∥∥
op
(A25)
≤ 1
2pi
q∑
k=K
sup
λ∈∂Bkδ+ε
‖Rλ(A)−Rλ(An)‖op · 2pi · (δ + ε) (A26)
≤ (q − (K − 1)) · (δ + ε) ·max
k≥K
(
sup
λ∈∂Bkδ+ε
‖Rλ(A)−Rλ(An)‖op
)
. (A27)
Furthermore, for any k and λ ∈ ∂Bkδ+ε, the second resolvent identity yields
‖Rλ(A)−Rλ(An)‖op = ‖Rλ(A)(A−An)Rλ(A)‖op
≤ ‖A−An‖op · ‖Rλ(A)‖op ‖Rλ(An)‖op .
(A28)
We now show that the supremum over λ ∈ ∂Bkδ+ε in the right hand side of (A28) is bounded. Since both A and An are
Hermitian, it follows that their resolvent is normal and bounded for λ ∈ C \σ(An) and λ ∈ C \σ(A) respectively. The operator
norm is thus given by the spectral radius,
‖Rλ(A)‖op = max
k
|λk(Rλ(A))| and ‖Rλ(An)‖op = max
k
|λk(Rλ(An))| . (A29)
Note that the eigenvalues of Rλ(A) are given by (λk(A)− λ)−1. To see this, let λ ∈ C \ σ(A) and consider
det (Rλ(A)− µ1) = det
(
(A− λ1)−1 (1− (A− λ1)µ1)) (A30)
∝ det (1− (A− λ1)µ1) = (−µ)mdet (A− (µ−1 + λ)1) . (A31)
Since det(Rλ(A)) 6= 0 it follows that µ = 0 can not be an eigenvalue. Thus, eigenvalues of Rλ(A) satisfy
1
µ
+ λ = λk(A)⇒ µ = 1
λk(A)− λ. (A32)
The same reasoning yields an expression for eigenvalues of Rλ(An). Thus
‖Rλ(A)‖op = max
k
1
|λk(A)− λ| and ‖Rλ(An)‖op = maxk
1
|λk(An)− λ| . (A33)
Note that, by the definition of δ, for λ ∈ ∂Bkδ+ε, the eigenvalue of A which is nearest to λ is given by λk(A). Since this is
exactly the center of the ball Bδ+ε, it follows that
sup
λ∈∂Bkδ+ε
‖Rλ(A)‖op =
1
δ + ε
<∞. (A34)
Similarly, for λ ∈ ∂Bkδ+ε, the eigenvalue of An which is nearest to λ is given λk(An) since n was chosen large enough such
that |λk(An)− λk(A)| < ε and ε < r0/2. Since δ < r02 − ε, it follows that the smallest distance from ∂Bkδ+ε to λk(An) is
exactly δ and thus
sup
λ∈∂Bkδ+ε
‖Rλ(An)‖op =
1
δ
<∞. (A35)
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Hence, we find that the RHS in (A28) is bounded by
‖An−A‖op
(δ+ε)δ for λ ∈ ∂Bkδ+ε. Finally, this yields
‖{An < 0} − {A < 0}‖op ≤ (δ + ε)(q − (K − 1)) max
k≥K
(
sup
λ∈∂Bkδ+ε
‖Rλ(A)−Rλ(An)‖op
)
(A36)
≤ (δ + ε)(q − (K − 1)) ‖An −A‖op
1
δ + ε
1
δ
(A37)
=
q − (K − 1)
δ
‖An −A‖op n→∞−−−−→ 0. (A38)
In an analogous way we can show that
‖{An > 0} − {A > 0}‖op ≤
R
δ
‖An −A‖op n→∞−−−−→ 0 (A39)
where R denotes the index of the smallest positive eigenvalue of A. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 3. The functions t 7→ α(Pt,+) and t 7→ α(Pt,+ + Pt,0) are non-increasing.
Proof. Let 0 ≤ s < t. We need to show that Tr [σPs,+] ≥ Tr [σPt,+] and Tr [σ(Ps,+ + Ps,0)] ≥ Tr [σ(Pt,+ + Pt,0)]. Note that
for any Hermitian operator A on and for any Hermitian operator 0 ≤ T ≤ 1 we have
Tr [A{A ≥ 0}] = Tr [A{A > 0}] ≥ Tr [A · T ] (A40)
We first show Tr [σPs,+] ≥ Tr [σPt,+]. Write Ts := ρ− sσ and Tt := ρ− tσ and note that the eigenprojections are Hermitian
and satisfy
0 ≤ {Ts > 0} ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ {Tt > 0} ≤ 1 (A41)
It follows that
Tr [Tt{Tt > 0}] ≥ Tr [Tt{Ts > 0}] (A42)
and similarly
Tr [Ts{Ts > 0}] ≥ Tr [Ts{Tt > 0}] . (A43)
Combining (A42) and (A43) yields
t · (Tr [σ{Ts > 0}]− Tr [σ{Tt > 0}]) ≥ s · (Tr [σ{Ts > 0}]− Tr [σ{Tt > 0}]) . (A44)
Since s < t it follows that Tr [σ{Ts > 0}] ≥ Tr [σ{Tt > 0}] and thus α(Ps,+) ≥ α(Pt,+). The other statement follows
analogously by replacing {Tt > 0} and {Ts > 0} by {Tt ≥ 0} and {Ts ≥ 0}. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 4. The function t 7→ α(Pt,+) is continuous from the right.
Proof. Let t ≥ 0 and let {tn}n∈N ⊆ [0, ∞) be a sequence such that tn ↓ t (i.e. tn converges to t from above). We show that
limn→∞ α(Ptn,+) = α(Pt,+). Define the operators
An := ρ− tnσ, A := ρ− tσ (A45)
and note that
‖An −A‖op = |tn − t| · ‖σ‖op n→∞−−−−→ 0. (A46)
Since, in addition, both An and A are Hermitian and A−An = (tn − t)σ ≥ 0, it follows from the second part of Lemma 2 that
‖{An > 0} − {A > 0}‖op n→∞−−−−→ 0 (A47)
and thus
α(Ptn,+) = Tr [σ{An > 0}] n→∞−−−−→ Tr [σ{A > 0}] = α(Pt,+) (A48)
since operator norm convergence implies convergence in the weak operator topology. This concludes the proof.
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Lemma 5. The function t 7→ α(Pt,+ + Pt,0) is continuous from the left.
Proof. Let {tn}n∈N ⊂ [0,∞) be a sequence of non-negative real numbers such that tn ↑ t (i.e. tn converges to t from below).
Let An and A be the Hermitian operators defined by
An := ρ− tnσ, A := ρ− tσ (A49)
and note that A−An = (tn − t)σ ≤ 0 and ‖An −A‖op → 0 as n→∞. It follows from the first part of Lemma 2 that
‖{An < 0} − {A < 0}‖op n→∞−−−−→ 0 (A50)
and thus, since operator norm convergence implies convergence in the weak operator topology, we have
α(Ptn,+ + Ptn,0) = Tr [σ(1− {An < 0})] n→∞−−−−→ Tr [σ(1− {A < 0})] = α(Pt,+ + Pt,0). (A51)
This concludes the proof.
Lemma 6. For α0 ∈ [0, 1] we have the chain of inequalities
α
(
Pτ(α0),+
) ≤ α0 ≤ α (Pτ(α0),+ + Pτ(α0),0) . (A52)
Proof. Recall that τ(α0) := inf{t ≥ 0: α(Pt,+) ≤ α0}. Since, by Lemmas 3 and 4 the function t 7→ α(Pt,+) is non-decreasing
and right-continuous, the left hand side of the inequality follows directly from the definition of τ(α0).
We now show the right hand side of the inequality. Note that if t := τ(α0) = 0, then Pt,− = {ρ < 0} = 0 and thus
Pt,+ + Pt,0 = 1 and α(Pt,+ + Pt,0) = Tr [σ] = 1 ≥ α0. Suppose that τ(α0) > 0 and let {tn}n∈N ⊂ [0,∞) be a sequence of
non-negative real numbers such that tn ↑ τ(α0). Note that, since tn < τ(α0) for all n and t 7→ α(Pt,+) is non-increasing and
right-continuous by Lemmas 3 and 4, we have
Tr [σPtn,+] = α(Ptn,+) > α0 (A53)
by definition of τ(α0). Furthermore, since the projection Ptn,0 is positive semidefinite, it follows that
α(Ptn,+ + Ptn,0) = Tr [σ(Ptn,+ + Ptn,0)] ≥ Tr [σPtn,+] = α(Ptn,+) > α0. (A54)
The Lemma now follows since by Lemma 5 the function t 7→ α(Pt,+ + Pt,0) is continuous from the left and hence
α(Pτ(α0),+ + Pτ(α0),0) = limn→∞α(Ptn,+ + Ptn,0) ≥ α0 (A55)
which concludes the proof.
Construction of Helstrom Operators with Preassigned Type-I Error Probability
Given α0 ∈ [0, 1], it follows from Lemma 6 that firstly α0 − α
(
Pτ(α0),+
) ≥ 0, and secondly, since α0 − α (Pτ(α0),+) ≤
α
(
Pτ(α0),+ + Pτ(α0),0
)− α (Pτ(α0),+) we have that
α0 − α
(
Pτ(α0),+
)
α
(
Pτ(α0),0
) ∈ [0, 1] (A56)
if α
(
Pτ(α0),0
) 6= 0. It follows that, for any α0 ∈ [0, 1], a Helstrom operator with type-I error probability α0 is given by
Mτ(α0) := Pτ(α0),+ + q0Pτ(α0),0, q0 :=
{
α0−α(Pτ(α0),+)
α(Pτ(α0),0)
if α
(
Pτ(α0),0
) 6= 0,
0 otherwise.
(A57)
To see that Mτ(α0) indeed has type-I error probability α0, note that if q0 6= 0 then
α(Mτ(α0)) = Tr
[
σMτ(α0)
]
= Tr
[
σPτ(α0),+
]
+ q0Tr
[
σPτ(α0),0
]
= α0. (A58)
If on the other hand q0 = 0, then, by Lemma 6, we have α0 = α(Pτ(α0),+) = α(Mτ(α0)).
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3. Proof of Theorem 1
We first show the following Lemma which justifies the optimality of Helstrom measurements for asymmetric quantum hy-
pothesis testing.
Lemma 7. Let t ≥ 0 and let Mt := Pt,+ + Xt for 0 ≤ Xt ≤ Pt,0 be a Helstrom operator. Then, for any quantum hypothesis
test 0 ≤M ≤ 1 for testing the null σ against the alternative ρ, the following implications hold
(i) α(M) ≤ α(Mt) ⇒ β(M) ≥ β(Mt)
(ii) α(M) ≥ 1− α(Mt) ⇒ 1− β(M) ≥ β(Mt)
Proof. Let
∑
i λiPi be the spectral decomposition of the operator ρ − tσ with orthogonal projections {Pi}i and associated
eigenvalues {λi}i. Recall that
Pt,+ :=
∑
i : λi>0
Pi Pt,− :=
∑
i : λi<0
Pi, Pt,0 := 1− Pt,+ − Pt,−. (A59)
We notice that for any 0 ≤ Xt ≤ Pt,0 we have
Tr [(ρ− tσ)Xt] = Tr [(ρ− tσ)Pt,+Xt] + Tr [(ρ− tσ)Pt,−Xt] ≤ Tr [(ρ− tσ)Pt,+Pt,0] = 0 (A60)
and
Tr [(ρ− tσ)Xt] = Tr [(ρ− tσ)Pt,+Xt] + Tr [(ρ− tσ)Pt,−Xt] ≥ Tr [(ρ− tσ)Pt,−Pt,0] = 0 (A61)
and thus Tr [(ρ− tσ)Pt,0] = Tr [(ρ− tσ)Xt] = 0. For the sequel, let M¯t := 1−Mt and M¯ := 1−M .
We first show part (i) of the statement. Multiplying with the identity yields
M −Mt = (M¯t +Mt)M −Mt(M¯ +M) = M¯tM −MtM¯ (A62)
and adding zero yields
ρ(M −Mt) = (ρ− tσ)(M −Mt) + tσ(M −Mt) (A63)
= (ρ− tσ)(M¯tM −MtM¯) + tσ(M¯tM −MtM¯). (A64)
We need to show that β(Mt)− β(M) = Tr [ρ(M −Mt)] ≤ 0. Notice that
Tr
[
(ρ− tσ)M¯tM
]
= −Tr [(ρ− tσ)−M ] ≤ 0 (A65)
and similarly
Tr
[
(ρ− tσ)MtM¯
]
= Tr
[
(ρ− tσ)+M¯
] ≥ 0 (A66)
where the inequalities follow from 1 ≥M ≥ 0. Finally, we see that
Tr [ρ(M −Mt)] = Tr
[
(ρ− tσ)(M¯tM −MtM¯)
]
+ t · Tr [σ(M¯tM −MtM¯)] (A67)
≤ t · Tr [σ(M¯tM −MtM¯)] (A68)
= t · Tr [σ(M −Mt)] (A69)
= t · (α(M)− α(Mt)) ≤ 0 (A70)
where the last inequality follows from the assumption and t ≥ 0.
Part (ii) now follows directly from part (i) by noting that 0 ≤M ′ := 1−M ≤ 1 and
α(M) ≥ 1− α(Mt)⇒ α(M ′) ≤ α(Mt) (i)=⇒β(Mt) ≤ β(M ′) = 1− β(M). (A71)
This concludes the proof.
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Theorem 1 (restated). Let σ, ρ ∈ S(H) be benign and adversarial quantum states and let y be a quantum classifier. Suppose
that for kA ∈ C and pA, pB ∈ [0, 1] the classifier y predicts class probabilities
ykA(σ) ≥ pA > pB ≥ max
k 6=kA
yk(σ). (A72)
Let M∗A and M
∗
B be Helstrom operators for testing the null σ against the alternative ρ with type-I error probabilities α(M
∗
A) =
1− pA and α(M∗B) = pB . Then, if the type-II error probabilities satisfy
β(M∗A) + β(M
∗
B) > 1 (A73)
it is guaranteed that kA = arg maxk yk(ρ), i.e. ykA(ρ) > maxk 6=kA yk(ρ).
Proof. Recall that we define quantum classifiers to be of the form yk(σ) = Tr [ΠkE(σ)] where E is a CPTP map acting on the
input spate and Πk is a projective measurement. We can write y in the Heisenberg picture as
yk(σ) = Tr
[E† (Πk)σ] = Tr [Fkσ] (A74)
where Fk := E†(Πk). Since E is a CPTP map, its dual is completely positive and unital and thus 0 ≤ Fk ≤ 1 and∑
k
Fk =
∑
k
E†(Πk) = E†(1) = 1. (A75)
Recall that by the reasoning in Section A 2, the operator defined by
Mτ(α0) := Pτ(α0),+ + q0Pτ(α0),0, q0 :=
{
α0−α(Pτ(α0),+)
α(Pτ(α0),0)
if α
(
Pτ(α0),0
) 6= 0,
0 otherwise.
(A76)
is a Helstrom operator with type-I error probability α0 ∈ [0, 1]. Let M∗A := Mτ(1−pA) be a Helstrom operator with
α(Mτ(1−pA)) = 1− pA and notice that
α(FkA) = ykA(σ) ≥ pA = 1− α(M∗A) (A77)
and thus, by the second part of Lemma 7, it follows that
ykA(ρ) = 1− β(FkA) ≥ β(M∗A). (A78)
Similarly, let M∗B := Mτ(pB) be a Helstrom operator with α(Mτ(pB)) = pB and notice that for any k 6= kA we have
α(Fk) = yk(σ) ≤ pB = α(M∗B) (A79)
and thus by the first part of Lemma 7 it follows that
yk(ρ) = 1− β(Fk) ≤ 1− β(M∗B). (A80)
Combining together inequalities (A78) and (A80) we see that if
β(M∗A) + β(M
∗
B) > 1, (A81)
it is guaranteed that
ykA(ρ) > max
k 6=kA
yk(ρ) (A82)
what concludes the proof.
4. Proof of Corollary 1
Corollary 1 (restated). If σ and ρ are pure states then the robustness condition (8) is equivalent to
T (ρ, σ) <
√
1− f(pA, pB)
2
(A83)
where T (ρ, σ) = 12‖ρ− σ‖1 is the trace distance between the benign and adversarial states, and
f(pA, pB) =
{
1− pB − pA(1− 2pB) + 2
√
pApB(1− pA)(1− pB)
} 1
2
(A84)
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Proof. In order to prove the corollary, we show that the trace-distance bound in eq. (13) is equivalent to the robustness condi-
tion (8) from Theorem 1 expressed in terms of type-II error probabilities. For that purpose, we first derive an expression for the
Helstrom operators in terms of the fidelity between ρ and σ and subsequently solve (8) for F . This is then related to the trace
distance using Fuchs-van de Graaf. Recall that a Helstrom operator with type-I error probability α0 takes the form (A57) which
reads
Mτ(α0) := Pτ(α0),+ + q0Pτ(α0),0, q0 :=
{
α0−α(Pτ(α0),+)
α(Pτ(α0),0)
if α
(
Pτ(α0),0
) 6= 0,
0 otherwise.
(A85)
where τ(α0) := inf{t ≥ 0: α(Pt,+) ≤ α0}. We now proceed as follows. We first compute the spectral decomposition of
the operator ρ − tσ as a function of t. With this, we derive an expression for α(Pt,+) and subsequently compute τ(α0). This
yields an expression for the Helstrom operators with type-I error probabilities 1 − pA and pB which can then be used to solve
inequality (8) for the fidelity. We thus start by solving the eigenvalue problem
(ρ− tσ) |η〉 = η |η〉 . (A86)
Since σ and ρ are both pure states, we can write
σ = |σ〉〈σ|, ρ = |ρ〉〈ρ| (A87)
and hence (ρ− tσ) is of rank at most 2. It follows that there are at most two states |η0〉 and |η1〉 satisfying (A86) with nonzero
eigenvalues and, in addition, they are linear combinations of |σ〉 and |ρ〉
|ηk〉 = zk,σ |σ〉+ zk,ρ |ρ〉 , k = 0, 1 (A88)
with constants zk,σ and zk,ρ that are to be determined. Substituting this into (A86) yields the system of equations
zk,ρ + γzk,σ = ηkzk,ρ
−tγ†zk,ρ − tzk,σ = ηkzk,σ
(A89)
where γ := 〈ρ|σ〉 is the overlap between states ρ and σ. The two eigenvalues ηk for which these equations possess nonzero
solutions are given by
η0 =
1
2
(1− t) +R, η1 = 1
2
(1− t)−R,
R =
√
1
4
(1− t)2 + t
(
1− |γ|2
) (A90)
with η0 > 0 and η1 ≤ 0. With the condition 〈ηk|ηk〉 = 1, the coefficients zk,σ and zk,ρ are then determined as
zk,ρ = −γAk, zk,σ = (1− ηk)Ak,
|Ak|−2 = 2R
∣∣∣ηk − 1 + |γ|2∣∣∣ . (A91)
Recall that Pt,+ =
∑
k : ηk>0
Pk and hence Pt,+ = |η0〉〈η0|. We thus obtain the expression
α(Pt,+) = Tr [σPt,+] = |〈η0|σ〉|2 (A92)
= |z0,σ + Z0,ργ∗|2 (A93)
= |A0|2
∣∣∣1− η0 − |γ|2∣∣∣2 (A94)
=
η0 − 1 + |γ|2
2R
(A95)
Substituting in the expressions for η0 and R yields
α(Pt,+) =
1
2 (1− t) +
√
1
4 (1− t)2 + t
(
1− |γ|2
)
− 1 + |γ|2
2
√
1
4 (1− t)2 + t
(
1− |γ|2
) = 12
1− 1 + t− 2 |γ|2√
(1 + t)2 − 4t |γ|2
 (A96)
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The next step is to compute tA = τ(1−pA) and tB = τ(pB). By Lemma 3, the function t 7→ g(t) := α(Pt,+) is non-increasing
and thus attains its maximum at t = 0
g(0) = α(P0,+) = |γ|2 (A97)
Furthermore, note that the only real non-negative discontinuity of g is located at t = 1 in the case where |γ|2 = 1. Since this
corresponds to two identical states we exclude this case in the following and assume |γ| ∈ [0, 1). Notice that, if α0 ≥ |γ|2,
then we have that τ(α0) = 0. Otherwise, if α0 < |γ|2, then we have that α(Pt,+) = α0 if t ≥ 0 is the non-negative root of the
polynomial
t 7→ t2 + 2t(1− 2 |γ|2) +
(
1− |γ|
2
(1− |γ|2)
α0(1− α0)
)
(A98)
which is calculated as
t = 2 |γ|2 − 1− (2α0 − 1)
√
|γ|2 (1− |γ|2)
α0(1− α0) . (A99)
Thus, in summary, we find that τ(α0) is given by
τ(α0) =
{
2 |γ|2 − 1− (2α0 − 1)
√
|γ|2(1−|γ|2)
α0(1−α0) if α0 < |γ|
2
,
0 if α0 ≥ |γ|2 .
(A100)
First, we notice that if |γ|2 ≤ min{pB , 1 − pA}, then we have tA = τ(1 − pA) = 0 and tB = τ(pB) = 0 and hence
the robustness condition (8) cannot be satisfied. In the case where min{pB , 1 − pA} < |γ|2 ≤ max{pB , 1 − pA}, then
either tA = 0 or tB = 0. Without loss of generality, suppose that tA = 0. Then the Helstrom operator takes the form
M∗A = {ρ > 0}+ qA(1− {ρ > 0} − {ρ < 0}) and thus
β(M∗A) = 1− Tr [ρ ({ρ > 0}+ qA(1− {ρ > 0} − {ρ < 0}))] = 0. (A101)
In particular, it follows that the robustness condition 1 − β(M∗B) < β(M∗A) cannot be fulfilled. The same follows in the case
where tB = 0. Finally, if |γ|2 > max{pB , 1− pA}, then we have that tA > 0 and tB > 0. We notice that α(PtA,+) = 1− pA
and α(PtB ,+) = pB and thus Mτ(1−pA) = PtA,+ and Mτ(pB) = PtB ,+. Computing the type-II error for Mτ(1−pA) yields
β(Mτ(1−pA)) = 1− Tr [ρPtA,+] = 1− |〈η0|ρ〉|2 = 1− |A0|2 |γ|2 |η0|2 (A102)
= |γ|2 (2pA − 1) + (1− pA)
1− 2pA
√
|γ|2 (1− |γ|2)
pA(1− pA)
 (A103)
where |η0〉 corresponds to the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue η0 at t = tA. Similarly, computing the type-II error for
Mτ(pB) yields
β(Mτ(pB)) = 1− Tr [ρPtB ,+] = 1− |〈η0|ρ〉|2 = 1− |A0|2 |γ|2 |η0|2 (A104)
= |γ|2 (1− 2pB) + pB
1− 2(1− pB)
√
|γ|2 (1− |γ|2)
pB(1− pB)
 (A105)
where |η0〉 corresponds to the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue η0 at t = tB . With these expressions, it follows that
the robustness condition (8), i.e. β(Mτ(1−pA)) + β(Mτ(pB)) > 1, is equivalent to
F (ρ, σ) >
1
2
(
1 +
√
1− pB − pA(1− 2pB) + 2
√
pApB(1− pA)(1− pB)
)
. (A106)
Finally, the fidelity is related to the trace distance via the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequality which in the case of two pure states
leads to the equality
T (ρ, σ) =
√
1− F (ρ, σ). (A107)
With this relation, we arrive at a robustness condition expressed in terms of the trace distance T (ρ, σ) which is given by
T (ρ, σ) <
√
1
2
(
1−
√
1− pB − pA(1− 2pB) + 2
√
pApB(1− pA)(1− pB
)
. (A108)
This concludes the proof.
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5. Proof of Corollary 2
Corollary 2 (restated). If σ = |σ〉〈σ| is a pure state but ρ can be a mixed state, then the robustness condition (8) implies the
following sufficient condition for robustness, i.e. kA = arg maxk yk(ρ):
T (ρ, σ) < δ(pA, pB)
(
1−
√
1− δ(pA, pB)2
)
, (A109)
where δ(pA, pB) =
√
1−f(pA,pB)
2
Proof. We denote the convex hull enclosed by the set of robust pure states as C := Conv({|ψ〉〈ψ| : ‖|ψ〉〈ψ| − σ‖1 <
δ(PA, PB)}). Observe that any convex mixture ρ =
∑
i pi|ψi〉〈ψi|with
∑
i pi = 1 of any sets of robust pure states {|ψi〉〈ψi|} ∈C must also be robust. Thus it suffices to prove condition (16) implies ρ ∈ C. Note that the boundary consisting of non-extreme
points (which correspond to mixed-states) of C interfaces with the set C∗ = Conv({|ψ∗〉〈ψ∗| : ‖|ψ∗〉〈ψ∗|−σ‖1 = δ(PA, PB)}).
Thus, it suffices to compute the shortest distance r from σ to C∗, such that r = minρ∗ ‖ρ∗ − σ‖1 where ρ∗ ∈ C∗, then
‖ρ − σ‖1 < r guarantees robustness. Further note that for every ρ∗, ∃Dσρ∗D†σ ∈ C∗, where Dσ = 2σ − 1, such that
‖ρ∗ − σ‖1 = ‖Dσρ∗D†σ − σ‖1, and ‖p1ρ∗ + p2Dσρ∗D†σ − σ‖1 < ‖ρ∗ − σ‖1 for p1 + p2 = 1, and p1 6= 0, p2 6= 0. Therefore
to minimise the distance to σ, it suffices to require ρ∗ = Dσρ∗D†σ , a valid of which is ρ
∗ = 12 (|ψ∗〉〈ψ∗|+Dσ|ψ∗〉〈ψ∗|D†σ). As
such we have
r = ‖σ − 1
2
(|ψ∗〉〈ψ∗|+Dσ|ψ∗〉〈ψ∗|D†σ)‖1
= ‖|ψ∗〉〈ψ∗| − σ + 2|〈σ|ψ∗〉|2σ − 〈σ|ψ∗〉|σ〉〈ψ| − 〈ψ|σ〉|ψ〉〈σ|‖1 (A110)
Note that we have ‖|ψ∗〉〈ψ∗| − σ‖1 = δ(PA, PB) by definition and that
‖2|〈σ|ψ∗〉|2σ − 〈σ|ψ∗〉|σ〉〈ψ| − 〈ψ|σ〉|ψ〉〈σ||1 = |〈σ|ψ∗〉|Tr [|σ〉〈σ|+ |ψ∗〉〈ψ∗| − 〈σ|ψ∗〉|σ〉〈ψ∗| − 〈ψ∗|σ〉|ψ∗〉〈σ|]
= |〈σ|ψ∗〉|Tr [(σ − |ψ∗〉〈ψ∗|)(σ − |ψ∗〉〈ψ∗|)†]
= |〈σ|ψ∗〉|‖|ψ∗〉〈ψ∗| − σ‖1
= δ(PA, PB)
√
1− δ(PA, PB)
2
4
. (A111)
Applying the reversed triangle inequality, we finally arrive at
r ≥ ∣∣‖σ − |ψ∗〉〈ψ∗|‖1 − ‖2|〈σ|ψ∗〉|2σ − 〈σ|ψ∗〉|σ〉〈ψ| − 〈ψ|σ〉|ψ〉〈σ||1∣∣
= δ(PA, PB)
(
1−
√
1− δ(PA, PB)
2
4
)
. (A112)
6. Robustness with Depolarised Input States
Corollary 3 (Depolarised single-qubit pure states). Let σ, ρ ∈ S(H) be single-qubit pure sates and let Edepp be a depolarising
channel with noise parameter p ∈ (0, 1). Then, if pA > 1/2 and pB = 1 − pA, the robustness condition (8) for Edepp (σ) and
Edepp (ρ) is equivalent to
T (ρ, σ) <

√
1
2 −
√
2pA(1−pA)−p(1− 12p)
2(1−p)2 if
1
2 < pA ≤ 4−6p+3p
2
4−4p+2p2 ,√
p·(2−p)·(1−2pA)2
8(1−p)2·(1−pA) if
4−6p+3p2
4−4p+2p2 < pA ≤ 4−3p4−2p ,
1 ifpA >
4−3p
4−2p .
(A113)
Proof. In order to prove the corollary, we proceed in a manner analogous to the proof of Corollary 1. Specifically, we show
that the condition on the fidelity and trace distance in eq. (A113) is equivalent to the robustness condition (8) from Theorem 1
expressed in terms of type-II error probabilities. Recall that the type-I and type-II error probabilities are given by
α(Mt) = Tr [σ
′Mt] , β(Mt) = Tr [ρ′(1−Mt)] . (A114)
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Let σ′ := Edepp (σ) and ρ′ := Edepp (ρ) and recall that a Helstrom operator for testing the null σ′ against the alternative ρ′ with
type-I error probability α0 takes the form (A57) which reads
Mτ(α0) := Pτ(α0),+ + q0Pτ(α0),0, q0 :=
{
α0−α(Pτ(α0),+)
α(Pτ(α0),0)
if α
(
Pτ(α0),0
) 6= 0,
0 otherwise.
(A115)
where τ(α0) := inf{t ≥ 0: α(Pt,+) ≤ α0}. The robustness condition (8) is given by β(M∗A) + β(M∗B) > 1 where M∗A
and M∗B are Helstrom operators with type-I error probabilities α(M
∗
A) = 1 − pA and α(M∗B) = pB . Since pB = 1 − pA by
assumption, we have that M∗A = M
∗
B and the robustness condition simplifies to β(M
∗
A) > 1/2. We now proceed as follows.
We first compute the spectral decomposition of the operator ρ′ − tσ′ as a function of t and relate it to the fidelity between σ and
ρ. With this, we derive an expression for α(Pt,+) and subsequently compute τ(α0). This yields an expression for the Helstrom
operator with type-I error probability 1 − pA which can then be used to solve inequality (8) for the fidelity. We thus start by
solving the eigenvalue problem
(ρ′ − tσ′) |µ〉 = µ |µ〉 (A116)
which can be rewritten as (
(1− p) · (ρ− tσ) + p(1− t)
2
12
)
|η〉 . (A117)
We notice that the operators ρ′ − tσ′ and ρ− tσ share the same set of eigenvectors. Furthermore, if η is an eigenvalue of ρ− tσ
with eigenvector |η〉, then the corresponding eigenvalue µ of ρ′ − tσ′ is given by
µ = (1− p)η + p · (1− t)
2
. (A118)
From the proof of Corollary 1, we know that the eigenvalues of ρ− t · σ are given by
η0 =
1
2
(1− t) +R > 0, η1 = 1
2
(1− t)−R ≤ 0
R =
√
1
4
(1− t)2 + t(1− |γ|2), γ = 〈ρ|σ〉
(A119)
with eigenvectors
|η0〉 = −γA0 |ρ〉+ (1− η0)A0 |σ〉 , |η2〉 = −γA2 |ρ〉+ (1− η2)A2 |σ〉
|Ak|−2 = 2R
∣∣∣ηk − 1 + |γ|2∣∣∣ . (A120)
where ρ = |ρ〉〈ρ| and σ = |σ〉〈σ|. With this, we can compute the eigenvalues µk and eigenprojections Pk of ρ′ − tσ′ as
µ0 = (1− p)η0 + p · 1− t
2
, µ1 = (1− p)η1 + p · 1− t
2
,
P0 = |η0〉〈η0|, P1 = |η1〉〈η1|.
(A121)
Since η0 > 0 ≥ η1 for any t ≥ 0, we have µ0 ≥ µ1 and furthermore, the eigenvalues are monotonically decreasing functions of
t for |γ|2 < 1. To see this, consider
dR
dt
=
1 + t− 2 |γ|2
2
√
(1 + t)2 − 4t |γ|2
(A122)
and thus for ∀ t ≥ 0 and |γ|2 < 1
dµ0
dt
=
dR
dt
− 1
2
< 0 and
dµ1
dt
= −dR
dt
− 1
2
< 0. (A123)
Hence, since both eigenvalues are strictly positive at t = 0, there exists exactly one ξk such that µk vanishes at ξk, k = 0, 1.
Algebra shows that these zeroes are given by
ξ0 = 1 +
2(1− |γ|2)(1− p)2
p(2− p)
(
1 +
√
1 +
p(2− p)
(1− |γ|2)(1− p)2
)
> 1,
ξ1 = 1 +
2(1− |γ|2)(1− p)2
p(2− p)
(
1−
√
1 +
p(2− p)
(1− |γ|2)(1− p)2
)
< 1.
(A124)
24
We define the functions
g0(t) := 〈η0|σ′ |η0〉 = 1
2
1 + (1− p)(2 |γ|2 − 1− t)√
(1 + t)2 − 4t |γ|2
 , (A125)
g1(t) := 〈η1|σ′ |η1〉 = 1
2
1− (1− p)(2 |γ|2 − 1− t)√
(1 + t)2 − 4t |γ|2
 , (A126)
f0(t) := 〈η0| ρ′ |η0〉 = 1
2
1 + (1− p)(1 + t · (1− 2 |γ|2)√
(1 + t)2 − 4t |γ|2
 , (A127)
f1(t) := 〈η0| ρ′ |η0〉 = 1
2
1− (1− p)(1 + t · (1− 2 |γ|2)√
(1 + t)2 − 4t |γ|2
 . (A128)
With this, we now compute t 7→ α(Pt,+) as
α(Pt,+) = Tr [σ
′Pt,+] =

1 0 ≤ t < ξ1
g0(t) ξ1 ≤ t < ξ0
0 ξ0 ≤ t
(A129)
For α0 ∈ [0, 1], we compute τ(α0) := inf{t ≥ 0: α(Pt,+) ≤ α0} as
τ(α0) =

ξ0 0 ≤ α0 ≤ g0(ξ0)
g−10 (α0) g0(ξ0) < α0 < g0(ξ1)
ξ1 g0(ξ1) ≤ α0 < 1
0 α0 = 1
(A130)
where
g−10 (α0) = 2 |γ|2 − 1 + 2(1− 2α0)
√
|γ|2 (1− |γ|2)
p(2− p)− 4α0(1− α0) . (A131)
To solve condition (8) we now have to distinguish different cases, depending on which interval 1 − pA falls into. Firstly, if
1− pA = 1, then τ(1− pA) = 0 and thus β(M∗A) = 0 in which case the condition can not be satisfied. If 1− pA ∈ [g0(ξ1), 1),
then we have τ(1− pA) = ξ1. In this case, it holds that µ0 > 0 and µ1 = 0 and the Helstrom operator is given by
M∗A = |η0〉〈η0|+
1− pA − g0(ξ1)
g1(ξ1)
|η1〉〈η1| (A132)
and the robustness condition reads
β(M∗A) = 1− f0(ξ1)−
1− pA − g0(ξ1)
g1(ξ1)
f1(ξ1) >
1
2
(A133)
which cannot to be satisfied simultaneously with 1 − pA ∈ [g0(ξ1), 1). If, on the other hand 1 − pA ∈ (g0(ξ0), g0(ξ1)), then
τ(1 − pA) = g−10 (1 − pA) and µ0 > 0 > µ1. The Helstrom operator then is given by M∗A = |η0〉〈η0| which leads to the
robustness condition
1− f0(g−10 (1− pA)) >
1
2
(A134)
which, together with 1− pA ∈ (g0(ξ0), g0(ξ1)), is equivalent to
|γ|2 > 1
2
(
1 +
√
4pA(1− pA)− p(2− p)
(1− p)2
)
,
1
2
≤ pA ≤ 4− 6p+ 3p
2
4− 4p+ 2p2 . (A135)
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In the last case where 1 − pA ≤ g0(ξ0), we have τ(1 − pA) = ξ0 and thus µ0 = 0 > µ1. The Helstrom operator is then given
by 1−pAg0(ξ0) |η0〉〈η0|, leading to the robustness condition
1− 1− pA
g0(ξ0)
f0(ξ0) >
1
2
. (A136)
Together with 1− pA ≤ g0(ξ0) this is equivalent to
∣∣γ2∣∣ >

4pA(1−pA)−p(2−p)
(1−p)2(4(1−pA)−p(2−p)) , if
1+(1−p)2
2 < pA ≤ 4−6p+3p
2
4−4p+2p2
(4−3p−2pA(2−p))(2−p(3−2pA))
8(1−p)2(1−pA) , if
4−6p+3p2
4−4p+2p2 < pA ≤ 4−3p4−2p ,
0, if pA >
4−3p
4−2p .
(A137)
Finally, combining together conditions (A135) and (A137) leads to
∣∣γ2∣∣ >

1
2
(
1 +
√
4pA(1−pA)−p(2−p)
(1−p)2
)
, if 12 < pA ≤ 4−6p+3p
2
4−4p+2p2
(4−3p−2pA(2−p))(2−p(3−2pA))
8(1−p)2(1−pA) , if
4−6p+3p2
4−4p+2p2 < pA ≤ 4−3p4−2p ,
0, if pA >
4−3p
4−2p .
(A138)
Since by assumption ρ and σ are pure states the proof is completed by noting that we have
T (ρ, σ) =
√
1− F (ρ, σ) (A139)
by the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequality.
